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The context 
In the past ten years, Hong Kong 
has responded to the Vietnamese Boat 
People in three distinctive ways, 
ranging from initially a positive 
humanitarian response in 1975 to a 
developing negative reaction since 
1982, culminating in the endorsement 
of the forced repatriation of 51 Boat 
People from a detention centre who, 
on December 11,1989, at 3:00 am, were 
literally "taken from their beds, 
bundled into caged trucks," driven to 
the airport under tight security (200 
heavily armed riot police) and cover of 
darkness, and placed on a specially 
chartered flight to Hanoi. This app- 
roach has gained overwhelming sup- 
port from the Hong Kong people who 
believed that they have done as much 
as possible to house the Boat People. 
While this approach has drawn 
criticism from other countries, it was 
justified on two grounds: a) the Boat 
People being repatriated are not 
genuine refugees but illegal 
immigrants seeking better economic 
opportunities; and b) to send a clear 
signal back to the would-be 
Vietnamese Boat People in Vietnam to 
deter them from arriving in Hong 
Kong when the monsoon season ends 
in March. In addition, as the attitude 
of Hong Kong people has become 
increasingly hostile towards the 
Vietnamese Boat People, this approach 
is probably a deliberate attempt by the 
British government to show them that 
the "mother country is doing 
something for the colony" and to 
satisfy the demand made by China 
that every Vietnamese must be out by 
1997 when China takes over Hong 
Kong. 
With over 50,000 Vietnamese Boat 
People in Hong Kong (as of August, 
1989), and ~gardless of cries of protest 
(hunger strikes, demonstrations) in 
refugee camps and expressions of 
profound regret by countries such as 
Canada's, this forced repatriation is 
likely to continue as the solution to the 
Vietnamese Boat People crisis in Hong 
Kong unless a concerted effort is taken 
by the international community to 
effectively stop the continuing influx 
of Boat People into Hong Kong and/or 
launching launching a program to 
accept an increasing number of them 
for resettlement. 
The attitude towards 
Vietnamese Boat People 
Analyzing the Hong Kong 
people's attitude towards these 
~fugees  is a complicated task, because 
its root cause is not immediately 
apparent. It involves an acute sense of 
"helplessness" among Hong Kong 
people, particularly as a response to 
the June 1989 crisis in China. There is 
also a sense of "betrayal" and 
"abandonment" experienced by them 
in Elation to the "right of abode" issue 
with the UK government. As well, a 
sense of being "victimized resulting 
from the "power struggle" between the 
UNHCR and the UK is widely felt by 
the Hong Kong people. Hence, they 
do not want to be "burdened and 
troubled" by these "uninvited and 
unwelcome invaders." To understand 
this composite picture, it is necessary 
to take note of several factors: 
1) As 1997 approaches (by a 
negotiated treaty between the UK and 
China, with minimal participation of 
the Hong Kong government and 
people), Hong Kong will revert back to 
China. This by itself has created what 
is commonly known as "1997 jitters" 
resulting in thousands upon 
thousands of Hong Kong people 
applying for immigration to Canada, 
Australia, the USA and other places. 
However, many of the Hong Kong 
people, responding to the 10 years of 
"open door" policy instituted by the 
Beijing regime, are somewhat 
"hopeful" or, at least carried a certain 
level of "guarded optimism" that 
"business will be as usual" and their 
"life" will not be greatly or unduly 
"disrupted and dislocated." However, 
the June 1989 crisis in China provided 
a rude awakening. For many of them, 
there is no "escape route" from the 
impending "upheaval;" the sense of 
helplessness is acutely felt. While they 
make attempts to alleviate this sense of 
helplessness by capturing every 
opportunity to apply for visas to 
immigrate (for example, when 
Singapore announced in early August 
1989 that criteria for accepting 
immigrants from Hong Kong would 
be greatly relaxed, literally thousands 
of people lined up at the Singapore 
High Commission overnight to get an 
application form, and, when 
completed, paid a sum of HK $1,200 
for processing), international 
communities such as the USA, the 
UK, Canada, Australia, and others do 
not take any interest in "listening" to 
their impending plight, and least of all, 
"offeringtt them an "escape route." On 
the other hand, meetings were held to 
discuss the Vietnamese Boat People. 
Implicitly or explicitly, Hong Kong 
was "criticized" for its treatment 
towards the refugees and was 
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"threatened (US Senator Solaz's visit 
to Hong Hong in August 1989) that it 
would bear the consequence of being 
rejected by other countries when they 
themselves would be in a similar 
situation as a result of the 1997 
takeover of Hong Kong by the Chinese 
government. This indeed has 
intensified their sense of helplessness 
and uncertainty in the near future. 
2) The sense of "betrayal" and 
"abandonment" is directly related to 
the British government in its 
negotiation with the Chinese regime in 
Beijing. By and large, the "wheeling 
and dealing" was conducted, in the 
minds of Hong Kong people, without 
their "input" and without their 
"interest" being considered. They 
believed that the British government 
failed to negotiate a treaty with the 
Chinese regime that would guarantee 
their "security and stable future" in 
Hong Kong; and to provide them with 
an "escape route" in terms of granting 
them the right of abode in the UK had 
the situations after 1997 demanded. 
As over 3 million of the 6 million Hong 
Kong people were born there, as 
British subjects holding British 
passports, they believe that they have 
the inalienable right of abode in the 
UK However, not only has the British 
government denied them this right, 
but in spite of increasing opposition 
towards the Vietnamese Boat People, it 
has insisted on maintaining Hong 
Kong as the first port of asylum - that 
is, imposing upon its colony the 
requirement that it continue the "open 
door policy" for incoming Vietnamese 
Boat People while it has neither 
increased its involvement in resettling 
these Boat People, nor sought to secure 
a viable solution with the international 
communities to the Boat People crisis 
in Hong Kong, nor made substantial 
contributions either in financial terms 
or in kind to the running and 
maintaining of refugee camps. For 
example, in view of recent 
disturbances in different refugee 
camps, it was suggested that 
instead of over-stretching the 
limited resouxes of the Police force in 
Hong Kong, the British army stationed 
there and supported by the Hong 
Kong taxpayers should be drafted to 
keep order. However, this suggestion 
was turned down with the explanation 
that this British army was not "trained 
for civilian and/or police duties. The 
rejection was interpreted by the Hong 
Kong people as another indication of 
the British government's policy of 
%etrayal and abandonment." Worse, 
some Hong Kong people have 
interpreted this rejection, in 
conjunction with other issues 
mentioned, (e.g., maintaining Hong 
Kong as the first port of asylum), as a 
hidden agenda by the British 
government to bleed Hong Kong to 
death before the 1997 turn over. 
3) As Hong Kong continues, 
reluctantly, to be the first port of 
asylum for the continuing influx of 
Vietnamese Boat People, it is not 
directly involved in the decision- 
making process. Any decision made is 
seen as a "power struggle" between the 
two major players in the game - the 
UNHCR and the UK with the USA 
calling the tune behind the scenes, 
while Hong Kong is either totally 
ignored or, at most, allowed to assume 
the role of "spectator." Its citizens feel 
"victimized as "pawns" in the game. 
For example, with repatriation as the 
"game" played between the major 
players, the UNHCR, with the support 
of the USA, insists that this has to be 
done completely voluntarily on the 
part of the Vietnamese Boat People. 
The British government has yet to 
clearly spell out its position. T 
Hong Kong government, in spite 
overwhelming support of the Ho 
Kong people for "repatriating" tho 
Vietnamese Boat People who a 
'*- out" as non-&gees back t 
Vietnam, has been asked to app 
additional funding to construct 
refugee camps to reduce t 
overcrowded conditions in so 
existing camps (temporary hold 
centres) as well as to improve t 
living conditions for the Vietna 
Boat People in the existing ca 
While the major players continue 
seek a solution to settle the score 
the Hong Kong people continue to 
the UN's share of running the camps 
(the UN has yet to reimburse HK $ 5 
million for the fiscal year of 1989, to 
the Hong Kong government), 
repatriation is seen as a "farce." First, 
the number of Vietnamese Boat People 
voluntarily repatriated is small in 
comparison with arrivals. For 
example, on August 18, 1989, as the 
third group of some 121 Vietnamese 
Boat People leaving for Vietnam on 
board a jet, some 548 Boat People 
arrived in Hong Kong by sea. Second, 
since each repatriate was given a 
certain sum of money (US $50) by the 
UNHCR prior to departure and often 
times, they used this sum of money to 
buy "luxurious items" in Hong Kong to 
bring back "home," the repatriation is 
seen as an "invitation" to other 
Vietnamese in Vietnam to come to 
Hong Kong. Indeed, there were 
reported cases that among the "newly 
arrived" Vietnamese Boat People, some 
were "ex-repatriates." (The UNHCR in 
Hong Kong initially denied this and 
later admitted that there might be a 
few cases.) Nevertheless, the sense of 
being "victimized" as a result of not 
being able to be "master of one's own 
home" is deeply and widely felt by the 
Hong Kong people. 
In addition to the above- 
mentioned factors underscoring the 
largely negative attitude towards the 
Vietnamese Boat People in Hong 
Kong, a fuller comprehension of Hong 
Kong people's reaction to the 
Vietnamese Boat People requires a 
close examination on the following 
factors: 
1) Jealousy: With the impending 
"take over" of Hong Kong by the 
Chinese regime, many Hong Kong 
people are trying to find an "escape 
route" by emigrating to other 
countries. In contrast to the 
Vietnamese Boat People, it appears 
that the chance for the latter to leave is 
much better than that of the Hong 
Kong people since the Vietnamese 
Boat People are still the subject of 
discussion in the international 
community. However, while the Hong 
Kong people are "crying out" for 
attention to their impending plight 
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and "making attempts" to alleviate this 
increasingly "heightened level of 
anxiety," they are at the same time 
forced to support others by letting 
them have the very chance which they 
have come to believe as the "solution" 
to their "problems." Hence, in spite of 
the appalling living conditions in 
camps, they are at least a step ahead of 
the Hong Kong people in terms of 
leaving for other secure places before 
the inevitable establishment of a larger 
refugee camp in Hong Kong, this time 
for the Hong Kong people. 
(2) Sense of injustice: As a 
substantial portion of the Hong Kong 
people left China for Hong Kong in 
1949 when the People's Republic of 
China was established, some still have 
relatives or even family members in 
China. The Hong Kong immigration 
regulations have made "family 
reunion" a difficult and long-drawn 
process. In addition, in an attempt to 
stem the flow of "illegal immigrants" 
from China entering Hong Kong, a 
policy of "immediate repatriation" was 
instituted between Hong Kong and 
China. In other words, if a person 
from China who is not a legal resident 
of Hong Kong is caught by the Hong 
Kong police in their routine checks of 
identity papers (every Hong Kong 
resident by law has to carry hidher 
identity card for inspection when 
asked to produce it by the police) he or 
she will be immediately sent back to 
China. There are cases of relatives 
and/or family members of Hong Kong 
residents, who bypassed the "normal 
process" of obtaining immigrant visas, 
being sent back to China. For 
example, in August 1989 a legal 
resident of Hong Kong went on a 
hunger strike to protest the 
government's decision not to allow his 
son to stay with him in Hong Kong. 
This case, once vividly reported in the 
media, has intensified the feeling of 
injustice which was aptly reflected and 
captured by the following statement: 
''We spend millions of dollars for the 
Vietnamese Boat People, why can't we 
afford to accept this little boy?!" 
3) Location of camps: In an effort to 
alleviate the overcrowded conditions 
in the refugee camps, particularly in 
the temporary holding centres, new 
camps are to be constructed. 
However, the decision of where the 
camp should be constructed is, by and 
large, made by the government 
without any consultation with the 
local people. Recently the government 
decided to build a new refugee camp 
within the vicinity of a reservoir in an 
outlying district. This choice drew 
criticism and protest from the Hong 
Kong people. Their reaction to this 
was undoubtedly related to what the 
media reported - instances of 
Vietnamese Boat People polluting the 
waters in and around their refugee 
camps. Therefore, the Hong Kong 
people do not believe, in spite of 
numerous assurances from the 
government, that security measures 
and other amenities built in the new 
camp would make it virtually 
impossible for the Vietnamese Boat 
People to do anything that would 
pollute the drinking water of the Hong 
Kong people. Nor do they believe that 
the government is taking their 
legitimate concerns seriously. Instead, 
the government is taking orders 
directly from the UK to improve the 
living conditions for the Vietnamese 
Boat People so as to appease the 
UNHCR and the international 
community to distract from the 
criticism of the inhumane txeatment of 
the refugees. 
The Hong Kong people not only 
had feelings, they acted. Their 
concerted efforts included a sit-in, 
demonstrations, camping on the 
proposed refugee camp site for nine 
days (they were ultimately removed 
by the police). Their suggestion of an 
alternate site failed to convince the 
government to change the decision. 
As such, they felt that not only was 
their legitimate concern totally 
ignored, but, more importantly, the 
"interest and welfare" of the 
Vietnamese Boat People was 
unreasonably given priority. 
Combined with these various 
factors, media reports depicting 
criminal activities of Vietnamese Boat 
People, and saying that the latter were 
given priority in medical treatment 
(reluctantly admitted by one clinic 
close to a refugee camp when they 
stated that they treated the Boat People 
brought in by authorities first because 
they did not want too many of them 
roaming around there while waiting 
for treatment) have effectively 
"hardened" the negative attitude of the 
Hong Kong people, who already lived 
in limited limited and congested living 
space, towards the Vietnamese Boat 
People as "unwanted and unwelcome 
people." The Vietnamese Boat People, 
the Hong Kong residents argued, 
usurped the already limited social and 
medical services, while the Hong Kong 
residents' "uncertainty" about their 
own future heightened daily. 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis of Hong Kong 
people's attitude towards the 
Vietnamese Boat People underscores 
the fact that any solution to the "Boat 
People crisis" has to address the 
concerns deeply felt by the Hong Kong 
Kong people. As an August 1989 
survey indicated, about two thirds of 
the Hong Kong people urged the Hong 
Kong government not to approve 
additional funding for building new 
refugee camps and that an even greater 
portion of them would like the Hong 
Kong government to "press" the British 
government to end the policy of 
making Hong Kong the first port of 
asylum, even though they realized that 
their "opinion and effort" would be a 
futile exercise. However, without 
addressing their concerns directly, 
efforts and measures taken to ease the 
plight of the Vietnamese Boat People in 
Hong Kong, particularly those 
currently in "closed centres," would 
merely fall on "deaf ears." The reason 
is that administrators and workers 
running these camps are themselves 
Hong Kong people who share and 
identify with the concerns of the rest of 
Hong Kong. Ultimately, it is 
conceivable that the Vietnamese Boat 
People (especially the women and 
children) may become the scapegoats 
and victims. 
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